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This year we celebrate not only the twentieth anniversary of the Culture and Communication 
Studies section but also the twentieth anniversary of Ghassan Hage’s White nation—his 
ethnographic account of what he calls the white national subject.i My paper is an attempt to 
build on Ghassan’s work by considering research published since his book. I will argue that in 
the public culture of Australia, Indigenous people and Indigenous things are now prolifically 
affirmed. Before I explore this Indigenous-affirmative culture, let me explicitly exclude two 
topics: the extent and nature of racism against Indigenous Australians; and Indigenous 
Australians’ experiences of contemporary Australian society. 
The Indigenous-affirmative public culture is evident in the most recent of Reconciliation 
Australia’s biennial surveys. The 2018 Australian Reconciliation Barometer asked non-
Indigenous respondents whether the following ‘events/changes’ would ‘celebrate’ Australia’s’ 
‘national unity and diversity’.ii
• 78 per cent supported ‘official ANZAC Day ceremonies to honour Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander AND non-Indigenous soldiers’;
• 72 per cent supported ‘acknowledgement of the Traditional Custodians of the land at
Australian Citizenship ceremonies’;
• 71 per cent agree with ‘establishing a national day of significance that celebrates
Indigenous histories and cultures’iii
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• 69 per cent supported ‘official dual naming of significant sites in Australia, using English
and Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander names (for example, Uluru/Ayers Rock)’;
• 60 per cent supported ‘having Welcome to Country addresses at major sporting events
(for example, at the Melbourne Cup, International sporting matches, etc)’. 
• The Reconciliation Barometer shows these proportions to have risen between 2014 and
2018.iv
This Indigenous-affirmative formation within Australian culture is not what you would expect 
after reading Ghassan Hage’s White Nation. Ghassan evoked the white national subject mostly 
in terms of its unconscious and conscious stance towards the non-English-speaking and non-
white migrant. He also devoted a few words to the ways that Indigenous Australians figure in 
the white nationalist imaginary. He wrote that the ‘national will’ was formed historically as ‘the 
Australian colonizing national will’ when it ‘exterminated and caged Aboriginal people’; this 
white national will ‘started valuing [Indigenous Australians] when they no longer constituted a 
communal counter-will in themselves’.v
Since White Nation, observers of Australian culture have noted the strength of an articulate 
anti-racist political identity in Australia.vi If the anti-racist Australian subject that these 
authors have described is as real as the white national subject evoked by Hage, then non-
Indigenous (‘white’) Australian subject positions are heterogeneous, and we should not 
suppose that there is a modal or typical non-Indigenous disposition towards Indigenous 
difference. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu to propose that non-Indigenous opinion and feeling 
is arrayed within a ‘field’ enables us to reconsider a theoretical feature of White Nation: Hage’s 
supposition of single model of white subjectivity, a typical white Australian consciousness. 
I propose that we conceive non-Indigenous thinking about the Indigenous to be a field of 
different white subject position. I call this field ‘the reconciliation orthodoxy’.
Before describing the structure of that field, let’s recall some steps in Australia’s public 
culture that have led to the formation of the ‘reconciliation orthodoxy’:
The 1960s: politically significant public sympathy for the argument that Australians 
should recognise customary land rights, mandating land rights and native title 
legislation since 1966, in every Australian jurisdiction.
1973: the formation of the Aboriginal Arts Board within the new Australia Council
1973: the Australian government’s renunciation of ‘assimilation’ as the goal of 
Australian policy and the promotion of ‘self-determination’.
1980s: much debate, during the planning of the 1988 Bicentennial, about how the 
national story should be told. During this debate, revisionist scholarship featuring the 
violent conquest of Indigenous Australians became widely accepted.
1988-91: the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody turned from 
an inquiry into possible criminal liability for specific fatalities into a comprehensive, 
researched account of colonisation’s legacy of inequality between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Australians.
1990-91: the formation of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, and the 
initiation of a civic program that interpellated Australians as either Indigenous or 
non-Indigenous and enjoined them to work on their relationships with the kind of 
Australians they were not. 
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1992: The High Court recognises Indigenous customary law as a source of law in 
Australia. Keating’s Redfern speech.
1995-97: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s Bringing Them Home 
(‘Stolen Generations’) report and subsequent ‘sorry’ movement and debate.
2000-2001: Centenary of Federation as a state-endorsed moment of reflection on the 
nation’s past and future.
2001-present: Reconciliation Australia’s promotion of Reconciliation Action plans 
and innovations in Australian rituals.
Since the 1990s the State has promoted certain terms for understanding what it is to be 
‘Australian’. Being ‘Australian’ now includes being implicated, in some way, in a history 
acknowledged as colonial and in a future seen as continuing efforts of reconciliation. In 
promoting this way of thinking about Australia the State has recruited powerful civil society 
allies. Nowadays, it is a public relations necessity to be seen to be aligned with reconciliation 
and to find something positive to say about Indigenous people and things.
In a paper co-authored with Anna Pertierra I have attempted to formulate this 
‘reconciliation orthodoxy’ as consisting of three points.vii
• That in Australian society there are two kinds of people ‘Indigenous’ and ‘non-
Indigenous’.
• That the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous is a problem of
nationhood, requiring Australians’ ongoing attention. 
• That giving such attention includes affirming the Indigenous as valued. 
For this three-part framework to become so widely accepted as common sense there has to 
be room within it for variation of opinion. Anna and I certainly found variation of opinion in 
our interview data. But what we also found was a high level of reflexivity and wariness in what 
people said about the Indigenous; interviewees seemed aware that they are taking a position 
within a field of possible positions. Accordingly, we argue that this three-part structure defines 
a field in which self-conscious position-taking is possible. Here is the reconciliation orthodoxy 
again, showing how it is a field open to position-taking. 
• That in Australian society there are two kinds of people ‘Indigenous’ and ‘non-
Indigenous’. (Australians take positions on who is truly ‘Indigenous’.)
• That the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous is a problem of 
nationhood, requiring Australians’ ongoing attention. (Australians contest how the 
‘problem’ should be understood and what ‘solutions’ are required.)
• ‘That giving such attention includes affirming the Indigenous as valued. (Australians 
disagree about the terms of positive valuation, but it has become difficult to say that the 
Indigenous has no value at all.) 
To conceptualize ‘white Australian’ subjectivity as a field in which certain ideas are accepted 
and others are open to variation and conscious dispute seems to Anna and I to make better 
sense of our interview data than Hage’s postulation of a typical white Australian subject 
position. Some of our interview subjects seemed to value Indigenous Australians as what Hage 
calls ‘a communal counter-will in themselves’. That is, we think that at least some of our non-
Indigenous interviewees now see themselves as answerable to Indigenous Australians’ demand 
for respect. The idea that white subjectivity is a field of variation also helps to make sense of 
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another feature of our interview subjects: their observable reflexivity. Our interviewees at times 
consciously situated themselves within what they understood to be a field structured by two 
axes of difference: the Indigenous/non-Indigenous difference and the difference between white 
disrespect/ignorance and white respect/openness.  
If the reconciliation orthodoxy is part of Australia’s ‘public culture’, then we should recall 
what Donald Horne, chair of the Australia Council from 1985 to 1990, said about ‘public 
culture’ in Ideas for a Nation.viii By ‘public culture’ Horne meant the languages, images and 
myths that ‘purport to resemble the national life of that state.’ix He recalled that the challenge 
to rethink Australia’s national identity had begun in the 1960s, ‘related to the emergence for 
the first time in Australia of significant groups of highly educated people who wanted to 
define Australia as a place that had room for them.’x This ferment included not only claims by 
the highly educated but also ‘a movement, run by the Aborigines themselves, attempting to 
define Australia as though the blacks were part of it’, rather than a mere ‘disposal problem’ for 
the nation.xi By the late 1980s debate about Australia’s Bicentennial (1988) had raised the 
issue of how a settler colonial culture can honour a persistent Indigenous presence.
By describing the ‘reconciliation orthodoxy’ as a structure within which variation of opinion 
is possible, we have attempted to accommodate an important theoretical point made by 
Donald Horne. A ‘public culture’, as Horne presents the concept, is not a true representation 
of the complexities of society to which it tendentiously refers; rather, as a representation it is ‘a 
form of limiting and organising “realities”. By its very nature it must be "representationally 
repressive" and it imposes ‘a coercive monopoly on what purports to be national life and public 
opinion.’xii 
The ‘reconciliation orthodoxy’ is ‘representationally repressive’ in at least two ways. First, the 
Indigenous/non-Indigenous binary is not the only binary that figures in Australians’ talk about 
themselves. Other salient binaries are: male/female; immigrant/native-born; English-speaking/
non-English-speaking; Christian/Muslim; well-off/struggling. Each of these binaries is the 
vocabulary for a certain theme of talk about social justice and national unity. James Jupp has 
argued that it would be possible to make too much of the Indigenous/non-Indigenous binary: 
‘despite the good intentions of those involved’ it is not ‘sensible to divide the population 
between Aborigines…and “settlers or invaders”….This suggests that an English-speaking, 
thoroughly Australian Aborigine living in Blacktown is in some way more legitimately 
distinctive than a Macedonian living in Thomastown or a Vietnamese living in Cabramatta. To 
divide Australians in this simplistic way devalues the significance of a wide variety of cultures.’  
I agree. However, I also note Jupp’s additional remark: ‘Yet some form of reconciliation with 
Australia inevitably will have to be made and…Australian identity has only slowly confronted 
the lie of its foundation – terra nullius.’ xiii Here Jupp is pointing to the established moral and 
civic pertinence of this representationally repressive binary. 
Second, the ‘reconciliation orthodoxy’ is ‘representationally repressive’ in that it puts pressure 
on non-Indigenous Australians to be careful, self-censoring, and it might even confuse them. 
When Anna and I analysed ‘Australian Cultural Field’ interviews with non-Indigenous 
Australians about their tastes we were struck by the wariness of many people’s words about 
Indigenous matters. In their carefulness and reflexivity people also made reference to what 
they see as recent and fast-moving changes in their own understanding of Indigeneity.
However, we should not assume that a ‘representationally repressive’ public culture is 
politically reactionary. Horne assured his readers that the themes of a public culture can be 
politically progressive: they ‘can show people how to act.’xiv Indeed Horne wrote in 1989 
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that ‘among non-Aboriginal Australians sympathies for Aborigines appeared in the public 
culture well ahead of sympathy amongst most of the people.’xv Within the reconciliation 
orthodoxy there are ideological resources for a progressive politics, such as the campaign for 
constitutional recognition and a more respectful response to the 2017 Uluru Statement from 
the Heart. 
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